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Abstract 
 
 Ransomware has become a significant global threat with the ransomware-as-a-service 
model enabling easy availability and deployment, and the potential for high revenues creating a 
viable criminal business model. Individuals, private companies or public service providers e.g. 
healthcare or utilities companies can all become victims of ransomware attacks and consequently 
suffer severe disruption and financial loss. Although machine learning algorithms are already 
being used to detect ransomware, variants are being developed to specifically evade detection 
when using dynamic machine learning techniques. In this paper we introduce NetConverse, a 
machine learning analysis of Windows ransomware network traffic to achieve a high, consistent 
detection rate. Using a dataset created from conversation-based network traffic features we 
achieved a true positive detection rate of 97.1% using the Decision Tree (J48) classifier. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Ransomware has become a significant global threat in the last 2 years with the FBI 
estimating that $1Billion of ransom demands were paid in 2016; this represents a 400% 
increase from the previous year [1]. In the same period the U.S. experienced a 300% increase 
in the number of daily ransomware attacks [2] and the cost of the average ransom demand 
doubled [3]. At the end of 2015 Symantec logged a record number (100) of new ransomware 
families [3]. The increase over the 2-year period is attributed to the rise of ransomware-as-a-
service (RaaS) model. RaaS provided the cybercriminal with the ability to purchase 
ransomware creation kits and source code and distribute ransomware with very little technical 
knowledge [4]. 
 In 2016 Europol reported that ransomware had become the primary concern for 
European law enforcement agencies with Cryptoware (the class of ransomware that encrypts 
files in comparison to the decreasingly prevalent locker class) the most prominent malware 
threat [5]. In July 2016 the No More Ransom project [6] was launched as a partnership 
between European law enforcement and IT Security companies in an attempt to disrupt 
ransomware related criminal activities, and help businesses and individuals mitigate against 
the impact of ransomware. Similarly commercial software products have been developed to 
defend networks; Cybereason [7] uses behavioural techniques to protect consumer networks; 
Darktrace [8] has employed advanced unsupervised machine learning to protect enterprise 
networks. 
 Several machine learning techniques and frameworks have been proposed and 
undertaken for ransomware detection. However, dynamic analysis techniques have 
limitations in that new ransomware variants can be redesigned in an attempt to decrease the 
rate of  detection by machine learning algorithms [9]. The application of machine learning for 
dynamic analysis of ransomware has achieved detection rates >96% [10]. Similarly, the 
application of machine learning for network traffic analysis of Android malware has achieved 
detection rates >99% [11]. 
 The vast majority of ransomware threats today are designed to target personal 
computers running the Windows operating system since Windows-based computers make up 
around 89 percent the OS market share of desktop computers [12]. The NetConverse model 
will focus on the Windows environment and proposes to leverage machine learning 
techniques for detecting Windows ransomware through analysing network traffic. The 
contributions made to achieve this goal are as follows:   
(a) The evaluation study analysed network traffic for 9 ransomware families with 210 
samples, and 3 goodware types with 264 samples. 
(b) 6 machine learning classifiers were evaluated and classified into 3 groups. 
(c) 13 features from ransomware samples traffic were extracted and deployed. These 
samples were extracted using TShark [13].  
 
 The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses related works on the topic of 
machine learning, ransomware detection and network traffic analysis; Section 3 describes the 
research methodology and the three phases that it comprises; Section 4 presents the 
experiment and discusses the results; Section 5 presents the conclusion and discusses future 
works. 
 
 
2. Related Works 
 Malicious programs and exploit kits have always been important tools in cyber 
criminals’ toolset [14], and machine learning techniques have been used for decades for 
malware detection and analysis [15].  
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 Different detection, analysis and investigation approaches have been proposed to 
defend against malware however malicious programs are employing a variety of propagation 
and evasion techniques to bypass defensive mechanisms [16]. Malware classification using 
machine learning has proved very successful in the detection of Android malware [17]. 
Malware behavioural characteristics such as API calls, filesystem changes and network traffic 
have been used as features for different classification tasks [18], hence machine learning can 
be utilised for Ransomware detection as well [19].  
 Ransomware can be categorized into two main classes: Locker ransomware denies 
access to the computer or device [12]; Crypto ransomware prevents access to files or data. As 
ransomware samples are using different evasion techniques, any ransomware analysis should 
take these techniques into account [20], [21]. Previous works for ransomware detection and 
analysis can be divided into static and dynamic approaches [22]; static approaches are relying 
on ransomware signature or utilisation of a cryptographic primitive function for detection 
[23]; dynamic methods are using dynamic binary instrumentation such as ransomware 
runtime activities for detection [24].  
 EldeRan [10], which was a ransomware classifier based on a sample’s dynamic 
features, could achieve a True Positive Rate (TPR) of 96.3% with a low False Positive Rate 
(FPR) of 1.6%. UNVEIL [25] is another machine learning based system for ransomware 
detection using a ransomware sample interacting with the underlying O.S. which achieved a 
True Positive Rate (TPR) of 96.3%, and a zero False Positive Rate (FPR). Network 
behaviours and Netflow data can also be used for ransomware detection [26].   
 With NetConverse we are investigating the application of different machine learning 
classifiers in detecting ransomware samples using features extracted from network traffic 
conversations; we report accuracy, TPR and FPR as metrics to evaluate the performance of 
our classification tasks.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
 This section presents the data collection, feature extraction and machine learning 
classifier phases of our experiment. The 3 phases are outlined in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Workflow showing the 3 phases for the experiment 
  
 
 In the data collection phase, the network traffic samples are collected for both 
malicious (ransomware) and benign Windows applications. The feature extraction phase 
extracts the relevant features and merges them to create our dataset. In the final machine 
learning classifier stage, we train and test several algorithms in the Waikato Environment for 
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Knowledge Analysis 3.8.1 (WEKA) machine learning tool [27] to identify the optimum 
detection model. 
 
3.1 Data collection phase 
 
 In this experiment, we are focusing on Windows ransomware network traffic and 
looking at the characteristics of the network conversations created when a host is infected. 
The infected host will attempt to connect to a remote attacker network address which could 
be a command and control server, payment or distribution website [28]. Thus, these are the 
network conversations that we are capturing and comparing with the characteristics of a 
benign applications using different classification techniques. 
 
3.1.1 Malicious applications 
 
 We identified the ransomware families to be included in our experiment by looking at 
the current tracked families on the Ransomware Tracker website, namely Cerber, Cryptowall, 
CTB-Locker, Locky, Padcrypt, Paycrypt, Teslacrypt and Torrentlocker. The site provides an 
overview of the internet infrastructure used by ransomware cyber criminals [28].  
Cryptolocker was also included due to its prevalence prior to 2014. By searching for the 
specific ransomware families in the Virus Total Intelligence platform [29] we could identify 
portable executable samples that had a corresponding behavioural analysis network traffic 
capture. For each sample the PCAP file was downloaded and saved with the name of the 
sample hash value. In total, we collected 210 network traffic captures which are summarised 
in Table 1. 
 
           
 Table 1 
           Summary of ransomware families 
 
Ransomware Family Class Sample size 
Cerber Crypto 30 
Cryptowall Crypto 30 
Cryptolocker Crypto 30 
CTB-Locker Locker 30 
Locky Locker 30 
Padcrypt Crypto 1 
Paycrypt Crypto 2 
Teslacrypt Crypto 27 
Torrentlocker Locker 30 
 
 
3.1.2 Benign applications 
 
 Our benign network traffic samples (goodware) were also collected from the Virus 
Total Intelligence platform [29]. Our search criteria targeted portable executable files that had 
been submitted at least 3 times and had 0 detections by antivirus engines. The search was 
applied to several different behavioural report criteria to provide a collection of 264 
goodware samples. 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Feature selection and extraction: 
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 Feature extraction was achieved using TShark, a terminal based feature of the 
network protocol analyser Wireshark [30]. The network traffic capture PCAP files can be 
analysed within Wireshark, but it offers limited export features. TShark provides a more 
flexible, powerful export feature that can create statistical, calculated data in addition to static 
feature extraction. We chose to extract several basic, traffic and connection based features 
using the TShark conversations export option. This aggregated each network capture file into 
unique conversations based on the 5-tuple [31] protocol, source/destination IP address, 
source/destination port values; the equivalent statistical values were also extracted. Each 
export file was merged together to create our initial pre-processed data. Table 2 shows the list 
of extracted features. Table 3 shows a sample of the dataset before cleaning. 
Table 2  
List of extracted features 
Feature name Type  [32], [33]   Description 
Protocol Basic Protocol type 
Address A Basic Source IP address 
Port A Basic Source host port number 
Address B Basic Destination IP address 
Port B Basic Destination host port number 
Packets Basic Total number of packets per conversation 
Bytes Basic Total number of bytes per conversation 
Packets A → B Connection The number of packets from source to destination 
Bytes A → B Connection The number of bytes sent from source to destination 
Packets B → A Connection The number of packets sent from destination to source 
Bytes B → A Connection The number of bytes sent from destination to source 
Rel Start Basic Time relative to start of the conversation (seconds) 
Duration Basic Duration of the conversation (seconds) 
 
Table 3 
Dataset sample 
 
Protocol Address A Port A Address B Port B Packets Bytes 
Packets 
A → B 
Bytes 
A → B 
Packets 
B → A 
Bytes B 
→ A 
Rel 
Start 
Duration 
17 192.168.56.15 59612 91.121.216.96 6892 0 0 1 56 1 56 73.18 0 
6 192.168.56.17 58762 2.18.213.64 80 124 164942 64 15590 188 180532 92.43 118.81 
6 192.168.56.26 57258 216.58.214.78 443 2699 3935279 1107 100421 3806 4035700 151.63 117.63 
6 192.168.56.19 55909 172.217.16.174 443 42 34349 33 11327 75 45676 176.14 116.65 
6 192.168.56.17 58768 23.37.54.100 80 4 1537 7 1302 11 2839 93.60 107.63 
6 192.168.56.14 49278 216.58.214.78 443 2694 3934720 610 62847 3304 3997567 184.56 104.34 
6 192.168.56.14 49273 35.161.88.115 443 13 4509 15 1642 28 6151 183.90 61.66 
6 192.168.56.17 58767 54.225.100.50 80 4 447 6 1070 10 1517 93.32 61.61 
 
 
 The pre-processed data was analysed to remove any outliers and erroneous records. 
We removed records with an Address A value of 0.0.0.0 and Port B records with a value of 
53 which represented DNS traffic. The Packets, Bytes, Rel.Start and Duration attributes were 
also removed to leave us with 9 features to use in the experiment. Finally, the IP address 
value in the ‘Address A’ and ‘Address B’ attributes were converted to decimal. Table 4 
shows a sample of the final dataset to be used in the experiment. 
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Table 4 
Final dataset sample 
 
Label Protocol Address A Port A Address B Port B 
Packets 
A → B 
Bytes 
 A → B 
Packets 
 B → A 
Bytes 
 B → A 
Goodware 6 3232236160 55559 1177009456 80 7 854 12 1737 
Goodware 6 3232237697 63318 2900408712 443 217 20075 995 1132562 
Goodware 17 167772687 123 1074006561 123 1 90 1 90 
Goodware 17 167772687 137 167772927 137 24 2640 24 2640 
Malware 17 167772687 68 167772674 67 0 0 2 1180 
Malware 17 167772687 123 884685931 123 1 90 2 180 
Malware 6 167772687 1045 3638213026 80 10 835 19 1468 
Malware 6 167772687 1048 876236452 80 5 335 9 990 
 
 The WEKA machine learning tool has an option to allocate a percentage split of a 
dataset for training and test purposes. We chose to manually split our dataset into training and 
test datasets to ensure each dataset contained records relating to an equal number of malware 
and goodware samples. Due to the difference in the number of conversations created and 
subsequently extracted for each sample, the number of instances in each dataset is different; 
the training dataset contained 75,618 instances and the test dataset contained 48,526 
instances. This equates to a percentage split of 60.91% for training, and 39.09% for testing of 
the NetConverse model.  Each dataset was finally converted into Attribute-Relation File 
Format (.ARFF) for processing within WEKA. 
 
3.3 Machine Learning classifiers 
 It is during this stage of the experiment that we identified the machine learning 
classifier and feature combination that achieved the highest detection rate. Table 5 outlines 
the 6 machine learning classifiers that we used. 
 
 
Table 5  
Machine Learning Classifiers [34] 
 
Classifier Pros Cons 
Bayes Network  
Fast computation and data 
training 
Impractical for large featured datasets 
Multilayer Perceptron Accurate estimation High processing time 
J48 
Fast and scalable classifier of 
decision tree 
Can be less effective on predicting the 
value of continuous class 
attributes 
K Nearest Neighbours (IBK) Simple, requires no training High processing time 
Random Forest  
 
Can improve predictive 
performance 
Output can be hard to analyse 
Logistic Model Tree (LMT) Flexible and accurate Potentially high bias 
 
 The experiments were performed within a virtual VMWare workstation environment 
running on Kali Linux 2017.1 and Debian 4.9.25 OS; 4GB memory was allocated from the 
host. The host laptop was a MacBook Pro with a 2.9Ghz Intel i7 processer, 16GB DDR3 
RAM and MacOS Sierra 10.12.4 OS. The machine learning tool used was WEKA 3.8.1 with 
a Java Runtime Version of 1.8.0_131. In the experiment, all 6 classifiers used their default 
values. 
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4. Experiments and Results 
 In this section, we present the results of our experiment and evaluate the classifiers we 
have used to achieve the best detection rate.  
 The experiment was split into 2 phases; the first phase ran 10-fold cross-validation 
using all 10 extracted attributes; the second ran 10-fold cross-validation using 8 extracted 
attributes (the Packets A → B and Packets B → A attributes were removed at this stage). In 
both phases each classifier model was re-evaluated against the supplied test dataset to 
evaluate its effectiveness.  
 
4.1 Evaluation measures  
 
 We evaluated the performance using the 5 standard WEKA metrics: true positive rate 
(TPR), false positive rate (FPR), precision, recall, F-measure. The metrics are summarised in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Evaluation metrics  
 
Metric Calculation Value 
True positive rate (TPR)  TP/(TP+FN)  Correct classification of predicted malware 
False positive rate (FPR)  FP/(FP+TN) Goodware incorrectly predicted as malware 
Precision TP/(TP+FP) Rate of relevant results 
Recall TPR Sensitivity for the most relevant results 
F-measure    2 × (Recall × Precision)/(Recall + Precision) Estimate of entire system performance 
 
TP= True positive, FN=false negative, TN= true negative, FP=false positive 
 
 
4.2 Latest malware experiment and results 
 
 Table 7 summaries the time taken to build each model in each phase of the 
experiment (with/without feature selection). Only 2 classifiers (KNN and LMT) experienced 
an increase in time taken to build the model; the other 4 classifiers (Bayes Network, 
Multilayer Perceptron, J48 and Random Forest) experienced a decrease in processing time 
due to a reduction in the number of attributes to be processed. 
 
Table 7 
Comparison of processing time (in seconds) 
 
Classifier Without Feature Selection (10 attributes) Feature Selection (8 attributes) 
Bayes Network 0.72 0.59 
Multilayer Perceptron 48.9 36.99 
J48 0.95 0.18 
KNN 0.01 0.03 
Random Forest 5.46 4.75 
LMT 28.5 32.7 
 
 Table 8 lists the results of our experiment without feature selection (10 attributes) and 
with feature selection (8 attributes). Only the random forest classifier demonstrated slightly 
decreased results with a higher FPR (+0.40%) and lower TPR, precision, recall and f-measure 
values. The Bayes Network and Multilayer Perceptron classifiers demonstrated a very small 
increase overall (0.10% and 0.30% TPR increase respectively). The KNN and LMT classifier 
results did not change. 
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Table 8 
Comparison without and with feature selection 
 
 Without Feature Selection 
Classifier TPR (%) FPR (%) Precision Recall F-measure 
Bayes Network 94.90 5.10 95.00 94.90 94.90 
Multilayer Perceptron 94.90 6.50 94.80 94.90 94.90 
J48 97.10 1.60 97.30 97.10 97.10 
KNN 95.30 4.10 95.50 95.30 95.30 
Random Forest 96.10 3.70 96.20 96.10 96.10 
LMT 96.80 3.90 96.80 96.80 96.80 
 With Feature Selection 
Classifier TPR (%) FPR (%) Precision Recall F-measure 
Bayes Network 95.00 4.70 95.10 95.00 95.00 
Multilayer Perceptron 95.20 5.50 95.20 95.20 95.20 
J48 97.10 1.60 97.30 97.10 97.10 
KNN 95.30 4.20 95.50 95.30 95.30 
Random Forest 95.10 4.10 95.40 95.10 95.20 
LMT 96.80 3.90 96.80 96.80 96.80 
 
 Table 9 summarises the highest performance achieved for each classifier. The results 
for each performance metric are shown: TPR, FPR, Precision, Recall, F-Measure. The J48 
classifier achieved the best performance across all 5 metrics, with a very low false positive 
rate (FPR) at 1.60% being an important factor in achieving a high overall system 
performance (f-measure) value. The J48 classifier achieved the highest accuracy with 97.10% 
followed by LMT with 96.80%, Random Forest with 96.10%, KNN with 95.30%, Multilayer 
Perceptron with 95.20% and Bayes Network with 95.00%. 
 
 
Table 9 
Malware detection evaluation result 
 
Classifier 
TPR 
(%) 
FPR (%) Precision Recall F-measure 
Feature 
selection 
Bayes Network 95.00 4.70 95.10 95.00 95.00 With 
Multilayer Perceptron 95.20 5.50 95.20 95.20 95.20 With 
J48 97.10 1.60 97.30 97.10 97.10 With/Without 
KNN 95.30 4.10 95.50 95.30 95.30 Without 
Random Forest 96.10 3.70 96.20 96.10 96.10 Without 
LMT 96.80 3.90 96.80 96.80 96.80 With/Without 
 
 
4.3 Result comparison 
 As far as the authors are aware there is no directly comparable study, however there 
are similar machine learning techniques and approaches that we can use to substantiate our 
results. 
 In [11] Android malware was analysed using a dataset created by extracting similar, 
but more statistical network traffic features. This technique achieved a 99.9% TPR with the 
random forest classifier, in comparison to a value of 97.1% achieved using the J48 classifier 
in NetConverse. In [10] Windows ransomware was analysed using features obtained via 
dynamic analysis. A slightly lower TPR of 96.3% was achieved. The final study [35] adopted 
a statistical network conversation approach to analyse botnet traffic, achieving an average 
TPR of 95.0% in the detection of 4 different botnet applications. 
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Table 10 
Comparison of results from similar studies 
 
Study Description Method Accuracy (TPR %) 
Mobile malware detection  [11] Android malware Network conversations 99.99 
NetConverse Windows ransomware Network conversations 97.1 
EldeRan [10] Windows ransomware Dynamic 96.3 
Peershark [35] P2P Botnets Network conversations 95.0 (average) 
 
 
5.  Conclusion and Future Works 
 The NetConverse model demonstrated an evaluation of different machine learning 
classifiers to detect Windows ransomware by analysing network traffic conversation data 
with a high rate of accuracy. Selected classifiers were Bayes network (BN), Decision Tree 
(J48), K-Nearest Neighbours (IBK), Multi-Layer Perceptron, Random Forest and Logistic 
Model Tree. 
 We trained the NetConverse model with a set of extracted network traffic features for 
further evaluation, using a set of different classifiers. In addition, we identified the best 
classifier based on the TPR value. The importance of this paper relies on the method used for 
collecting the samples and filtering the network conversations to remove any duplication and 
non-relevant attributes from our training dataset. Our experiment results (classifiers) show 
high performance attached with a high accuracy result.  
 The experiment results show a 97.1% detection rate accuracy with the decision tree 
(J48) classifier and 96.8% detection rate accuracy with the LMT classifier.  The experiment 
proves that machine learning classifiers can detect ransomware based on the network traffic 
behaviour.  
 This work is a baseline for future research in which researchers can extend and 
develop a dataset to include other ransomware families, and enhance the detection process by 
extracting additional attributes. There are several areas of research that could be undertaken, 
for example: developing real-time ransomware detection using cloud-based machine learning 
classifiers and outputting detection results for use within other tools.   
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